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climate-change mitigation interventions based on carbon 
forestry are no exception. They proudly feature ‘broad 
stakeholder participation,’ ‘social safeguards’ and ‘Free, 
Prior and Informed Consent’ (FPIC) procedures that require 
intervening agents to engage local people in decision-making 
(UN-REDD No Date; UN-REDD 2013; FCPF and UNREDD 
2012). Yet, concepts of participation in the UN documents are 
so capacious that they could encompass any practice – from 
democracy to corvée. Indeed, in integrating FPIC into its 
Performance Standards in 2012, the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) acknowledged that there is no universally 
accepted definition. Consequently, the IFC standards fail 
to define FPIC (IFC no date) – not that these would be so 
hard to define. Similarly, the World Bank’s Forest Carbon 
Partnership Facility (FCPF) has demoted the ‘C’ from consent 
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INTRODUCTION 
Public management of natural resources around the world is 
guided by discourses of local participation. Yet, the modes of 
participation that are based on substantive and empowered 
forms of engagement and, support and strengthen local 
democracy, remain elusive in forestry interventions. Recent 
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to consultation, implying that consent is no longer required, 
thus enabling intervening agencies to choose to override local 
people’s preferences (FCPF 2009).1 It looks like a green light 
for project implementers to consult local people and then do 
as they please.
For the for-profit corporations, the World Bank, and other 
bilateral and multilateral donor organizations, FPIC draws 
from the concept of Informed Consent and Participation 
(ICP) (Baker 2012), which is generally required for what 
these institutions classify as high-risk projects. ICP involves 
an in-depth and good faith exchange of views between project 
proponents and the populations that projects choose to define 
as ‘affected communities’ in a way that should influence how 
a project is carried out. Clearly, consent should be understood 
as the right of democratically represented communities to 
approve or reject proposed actions or projects that affect them 
(Tamang 2005; Lewis et al. 2008; Ribot 2004,2013). The issue 
of consent is one of the most critical challenges facing the 
development process. Government and project practitioners 
certainly have the urge to secure consent in order to avoid the 
risk of project refusal or resistance. Yet, they merely engage in 
activities that appear to provide local inputs and consent. Both 
FPIC and participation are problematic means for providing 
substantive social protection. There is no ‘freedom’ of choice 
when people lack the right to refuse predetermined options 
they are offered (Ece this issue). There is no freedom of choice 
when ‘prior’ provides insufficient time to reflect and organise. 
There are no real choices when in lieu of ‘informing’ people 
of their rights and project implications, intervening programs 
‘educate’ them on why they should agree to interventions 
(Mbeche this issue). There is also no ‘consent’, certainly not 
with the toothless form ‘consultation’, when the community 
is not engaged as a whole citizenry through local institutions 
or processes that democratically represent them (Lewis et al, 
2008; McGee 2009; Colchester 2010; Baker 2012; Ribot 
2015:44-box 16,137-138; Nuesiri this issue, Baruah this issue). 
The contributions in this volume show that, in practice, 
neither ‘community participation’ in community-based 
forestry, nor consent or consultation in carbon forestry, are 
based on substantive exchange of views (Colchester 2010; 
Ribot 2016:32,44; Marfo 2015; Mbeche this issue; Nuesiri 
this issue, Ece this issue). They remain mere theatrics. In 
international, national and local fora, where key decisions 
regarding access, use and ownership of public forests are 
taken, consent, consultation and participation are reduced 
to a mere presence of certain categories of ‘relevant’ people 
– defined to be relevant by those managing the process and 
usually called ‘stakeholders’. Whether these ‘relevant’ people 
democratically2 represent local people’s interests is, at best, of 
secondary concern. Project implementers often choose to work 
with non-democratic local actors, such as experts, customary 
chiefs, local committees or NGOs. In this respect, intervening 
agents or agencies, including national governments, forestry 
administrations, donors, international development agencies 
or environmental groups – that is, any supra-local institutions3 
that impose laws, programs or projects – fail to understand or 
to care that who is authorized to speak for or represent local 
people’ matters deeply if participation in decision making is 
to be substantively representative and legitimate. Our position 
is that representation is not about talking with interested 
parties that projects identify as ‘stakeholders’; it is not about 
having customary authorities and other influential elites at 
the table, nor should it be about consulting some vaguely 
defined ‘population’ on pre-determined goals and choices. 
Democratic representation required for substantive democratic 
engagement or democratic ‘participation’ is about broad-based 
citizen-driven decision-making. It requires democratically 
representative local institutions. 
In this special issue, we use basic principles of local 
democracy – concerning the degree to which leaders represent 
and are accountable to local citizens – to evaluate how 
people are included in decision-making (Manin et al. 1999; 
Ribot 2013,2004). Our definition is substantive rather than 
procedural. Hence, we acknowledge that electoral systems 
are not democratic when the leaders lack powers to respond 
to local needs or when the elections and other accountable 
means do not establish accountability – as is often the case. We 
acknowledge that systems without elections can be democratic, 
and a few are. Nevertheless, we take the position that electoral 
systems are preferable and represent the most durable and 
generalisable form of democratic representation (Manin et al. 
1999). Looking at responsiveness and accountability, we find 
in practice that the democratic ideals behind representation, 
consent, participation or social safeguards are rarely, if 
ever, evident in international forestry projects. Based on 
twenty-seven case studies conducted in thirteen countries 
(Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal, South Sudan, 
Tanzania, Uganda, Nepal and Peru) from 2011 to 2015, the 
Responsive Forest Governance Initiative (RFGI) research 
program,4 from which this special issue is derived, found 
systematic disjuncture between the donor and government 
claims of participation, representation and inclusiveness in 
policy-making, and project development and implementation. 
The articles in this issue describe and begin to explain that 
disjuncture. 
Political representation is responsiveness of government 
and leaders to people’s needs and aspirations. Representation 
is democratic when that responsiveness is driven by the 
accountability of decision makers to the people (Manin 
et al. 1999). Democratic representation requires political 
processes by which program and project decision makers can 
(i.e. are empowered to) respond and are also accountable to 
(meaning can be sanctioned by) citizens (Manin et al. 1999; 
Agrawal and Ribot 1999,2012). In the country cases in this 
issue, governments and donors hold up representation of 
local people in forestry decisions as an ideal. Policies and 
project documents for all cases proclaim the importance of 
representation, but do not define it in enough detail to know 
what it would entail in practice. Likewise, when asked, 
most development and forestry practitioners cannot define 
democracy in sufficient detail to be able to systematically 
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establish or support it – they cannot provide a substantive 
definition. They do not seem to know that it involves significant 
decisions in which the deciders are systematically accountable 
to the people of the jurisdiction. This is not to say that they 
do not believe in democracy. Indeed, they feel committed 
to promoting it. But, as important as it appears in discourse, 
policy documents, and in laws, accountable representation 
remains secondary to project forest management goals. The 
result is a slippage between stated commitments and practice. 
The idea of representation is draped over or performed next 
to forest management goals – the processes set up to engage 
local populations do not make the projects respond to local 
needs and aspirations. These processes are an enactment by 
intervening agencies of their participation requirements. The 
acts are used to facilitate local acceptance – through convening 
and consulting with select sub-groups or elites rather than 
broad-based public representation. Democratic representation 
is lost in the translation from discourse to documents or laws 
and then to practice. 
Where they exist, and despite their shortcomings (Manin 
et al. 1999; Ribot 2013; Chomba this issue), elected local 
authorities with the legal mandate to politically represent the 
citizens in their jurisdiction could serve as the institutional and 
legitimate basis for democratic participatory decision-making 
processes. Yet, as contributors in this special issue show, 
elected local governments in all of our case studies are 
circumvented. The sidelining, and thus delegitimation, of these 
elected local actors weakened these existing structures (Baruah, 
Chomba, Faye, Mbeche, Nuesiri this issue).5 Representatives 
(democratic or not), however, need to be recognized in order to 
have authority (Ribot 2006,2013; Ribot et al. 2008; Sikor and 
Lund 2009; Thomassen 2011).6 Bypassing them undermines 
their authority – not empowering (or disempowering) 
them and thereby robbing them of relevance, and therefore 
legitimacy, vis-à-vis citizens. Forestry projects tend to 
choose to create, empower, and legitimise, alternative local 
institutions – local line ministry offices (Faye this issue), 
committees (Baruah, Chomba, Ece, Faye, Nuesiri this issue; 
also see Manor 2005), and customary chiefs (Baruah, Nuesiri 
this issue; ; also see Ribot 1999; Ntsebeza 2005). These 
institutions are rarely democratically representative. Further, 
many of them, especially project-initiated committees are 
ephemeral – non-sustainable – and disappear with the comings 
and goings of project interventions (Murombedzi 2001; Manor 
2005). The outcome is a set of institutional arrangements that 
are neither democratically representative nor sustainable and 
that disempower and delegitimize duly elected representative 
local government – in a process that Faye (this issue and 2015) 
has called ‘derecognition’. 
This volume characterises how and explores why forestry 
projects and programs systematically circumvent elected local 
governments by creating their own alternative arrangements 
for local ‘representation’ or ‘participation’. The studies 
and broader literature suggest that the preference of the 
international agencies and donors to work with institutions 
other than elected local government has practical and 
ideological roots (Ribot 2004; Manor 2004; Ribot, Chhatre 
and Lankina 2008). The first practical justification is the 
need to achieve the forestry objectives of a program (in most 
of our cases, carbon forestry). Democracy is slow and 
intervening agents choose to work with local actors most 
likely to “efficiently” implement their programs and projects. 
The second, in service of the first, is control – where local 
forestry brigades, customary chiefs or user committees are 
easier targets of manipulation by central agencies or donors 
than are elected local governments. Third are ideological 
positions that are anti-government (in a Regan-Thatcher sense), 
pro private sector (part of the Regan-Thatcher neoliberal 
economistic stance), or pro customary authority (emerging 
from indigenous people’s movements and from a romantic 
ideology that everything indigenous is good – even if the 
leaders are colonially created, hereditary and/or despotic). 
These beliefs often steer projects toward NGOs, project 
committees, private user groups, companies or individuals, 
or customary authorities. These ideological overlays may 
merely serve as a support for implementing the instrumental 
objectives of the project, i.e. implementation of project 
goals – that is, they may be an excuse to work with the quickest 
and most-efficient institutions, rather than with messy and 
slow democratic processes. In many cases, the existence of 
customary authorities parallel to and often in competition 
with other local authority structures, provides intervening 
agents with a convenient motive to circumvent democratic 
processes and implement projects through these authorities. 
Or, these beliefs may be drivers of local institutional choices 
in and of themselves. Whatever the motive, intervening agents 
systematically avoid local democracy while favouring NGOs, 
user committees, chiefs and other private bodies. 
In the 1980s, corruption and lack of efficiency of state 
bureaucracies became an important focus of the new 
international development policy in Africa (World Bank 
1989, van de Walle 2001). The debates on the ‘failure’ 
of African states (Bayard 1989) were translated into the 
policy field as the ‘crisis of governance’ (Wunch and 
Olowu 1990). This provided a strong justification for 
pushing for decentralisation, democratisation and economic 
liberalisation under the idiom of ‘good governance’ (Olowu 
2003; Törnquist 2007; Kersting et al. 2009).7 These reforms 
also legitimated an expansion of national governing 
arrangements to include NGOs and private-sector institutions 
(see Frahm and Martin 2009). In this context, supporting 
NGOs became increasingly equated to contributing to the 
deepening of democracy, through the creation of a vibrant 
civil society (Bangura 1992).8 Indeed, NGOs are conflated 
with civil society and often considered as ‘de facto agents of 
democracy’ (Kamat 2004; see Saward 2008 as an example 
of this conflation). In this ‘inherently democratic and 
democratising sphere wherein private actors and institutions 
can flourish’ (Mercer 2003), the NGO is also seen to provide 
an enabling environment for private enterprise.9 Their 
proponents claim that NGOs are of and for the people; their 
representational claims – based on their location within the 
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sphere of civil society – remain largely unquestioned and 
are thus strengthened (Oyono 2015). 
‘Forest user groups’ or ‘environmental/forest committees’ 
are often involved in programs or projects as ‘representatives 
of civil society’ at the local scale (see Rutt and Lund 2014). 
These may be existing entities that forestry projects give 
new responsibilities and powers, or that which forestry 
projects create. These user groups and committees are 
hard to distinguish from NGOs – both are usually private 
bodies (self-defined as having public interest) that are in 
most cases paid or supported by governments and donors. 
Most NGOs, despite the ‘non’ prefix, are effectively paid 
agents of higher-level intervening agencies, often national or 
international governments (Fisher 1997; Shivji 2007; Banks, 
Hulme and Edwards 2015). Grassroots and civic organizations 
are often recognized by, and then co-opted into being paid 
agents of, outside organisations (Fisher 1997; Hearn 2007; 
Houtzager and Lavalle 2009; Oyono 2015). This special issue 
shows that forestry projects that claim to be ‘community based’ 
– including the UN and World Bank ‘Reduced Emissions 
from Deforestation and Forest Degradation with co-benefits’ 
(REDD+) projects – rely mostly on institutions other than 
elected local governments to represent local people and for 
project implementation (Chomba this issue; Nuesiri this issue; 
Mbeche this issue; also see Anderson 2012; Rutt 2012; Marfo 
2015).10 
Traditional authorities are yet another important locus of 
recognition by forestry projects discussed in this issue. In some 
countries like Nigeria (Nuesiri this issue), Ghana (Baruah this 
issue), chiefs continue to play an important role, especially at 
local scale in forestry programs. In other countries (e.g. Senegal 
– Faye this issue; Ece this issue), however, traditional 
authorities are not formally included in forest governance 
decision-making. This can be partly explained through their 
incorporation into the state administration after Independence. 
In countries where traditional authorities have been recognised 
as part of the post-colonial state governance, they are also 
incorporated into the forestry projects as ‘stakeholders.’ Yet, 
this incorporation is only partial, and is formally subsumed 
under ‘state’ authority (Nuesiri this issue, Chomba this issue, 
Baruah this issue). In such cases, we observe a re-enforcement 
of the reification of cultural identities, akin to what had been 
sought by colonial administrations through native authorities. 
In other words, international forestry programs continue to 
re-create colonial patterns – a kind of modern reproduction 
of indirect rule (Mamdani 1996; Ribot 1999,1996).11 At the 
same time, traditional authorities are not simply ‘re-invented’ 
through the reification of cultural identity but they are 
legitimated and reified when recognised (Povinelli 2002). 
Similar to the NGOs, whether or not they stand for local 
people’s substantive interests is overlooked. While their role as 
mediators with ancestors and custodians over traditional land 
continue to make them locally legitimate and relevant (Nuesiri 
2012), in some places they are even at times despised for the 
way they treat local people and for their history of collaborating 
with oppressive governments (Mamdani 1996; Ntsebeza 2005). 
Clearly the transfer of public powers to private bodies can 
also undermine democracy. Democratic space is closed down, 
or enclosed, by the privatisation of public forest resources. The 
public domain – the powers that are vested in democratically 
representative authorities – is constituted by control over 
resources and decisions relevant to local people. As those 
resources and decisions are privatised in the name of local 
management of forests, democracy is diminished. What were 
once decisions of elected rural authorities become private 
decisions of private collectives or individuals, despite the 
fact that these resources are privatised in the name of local 
democratic or participatory management. For example, in 
Ghana, the privatisation of tree tenure (Baruah this issue) and 
in Senegal the privatisation of use and commercial rights of 
public forests and the privatisation of charcoal production and 
trade (Ece this issue; Faye this issue) are important priorities 
of community forestry projects. In Kenya, private companies 
are creating their own private governance mechanisms through 
REDD+ projects (Chomba this issue). This placing of public 
resources in the hands of private bodies diminishes local 
democratic space – it encloses the public domain (see Ribot 
2004,2013; Rutt and Lund 2014; Ece this issue). 
In short, the local institutions – NGOs, chiefs or private 
bodies – chosen as partners by international forestry 
interventions shape local representation, as well as 
‘participation’ or FPIC. These choices are not tangential to 
forest governance – they define forest governance in those 
sites. Discourses and practices deployed in the name of 
participation – under the umbrella of participation, stakeholder 
consultations or FPIC – seem to provide a justification 
to support the establishment of necessary conditions for 
implementation of specific donor and government objectives. 
The authors in this special issue scrutinise the claims of 
representation put forth by different actors in international 
carbon and conservation projects. These programs include 
community-based conservation and development projects as 
well as projects oriented towards carbon markets. They analyse 
how ‘democratic participation’ is framed in public policies 
targeting the forests at national and international scales, and 
how these policies are put in practice in forestry projects. 
CHOICE AND RECOGNITION – FRAMING THE 
RESEARCH 
The studies presented in this special issue used what we call 
the ‘institutional choice and recognition’ research framework 
(Ribot 2006; Ribot et al. 2008). Each study examined the 
dynamics of decision-making processes involved in forest use, 
ownership and access; and the governance relations inscribed 
by community-based forest use and carbon forestry projects. 
We use the term ‘institutional choice’ to refer to the process by 
which development agencies, large international organizations, 
domestic organizations and national governments choose the 
local institutions or actors to partner with in their forestry 
interventions. We use the term choice in distinction from 
its use in neo-classical economics, institutional choice and 
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public choice economics. In our definition, it is about the will 
of authorities (intervening agents and their institutions) who 
make decisions, rather than assuming that governing decisions 
are an aggregate of individual choices articulated through 
governing actors (Ribot 2013). In this sense, the term choice 
attributes agency to these actors so that we can trace outcomes 
and thus responsibility back to their decisions. This is not to 
say that people’s consciousness and agency are not themselves 
somewhat structured (a la Bourdieu 1977; Foucault 2010).12 
The idea that individuals (or institutions composed of 
people who set policies and rules) make decisions is relevant 
for understanding political-economic relations – in this case 
the choices by higher-level institutions, such as development 
agencies choosing the local institutions they work with. 
Through these choices, they are shaping local governance, and 
in particular, they are shaping rights, recourse, representation, 
and recognition. Through the discursive justifications of 
their choices, they bypass local institutions (Rutt and Lund 
2014).13 We emphasize decisions in order to attribute agency 
to higher-level intervening agents. These intervening agents do 
decide, and thus should be responsible for, which institutions 
are being empowered and which are not; they recognise some, 
fail to recognise others and derecognise – remove powers from 
– yet other local institutions (Faye this issue). Institutions do 
not just emerge organically out of Ostrom’s (2009) polycentric 
bodies floating harmoniously in the luminiferous aether of 
Pareto optimality. They emerge from strategic decisions within 
structural relations. They emerge in the context of power 
struggles in a material world. 
Institutions are generated by social processes in which some 
individuals and organisations become recognised as relevant 
actors. People in need of services – whether it is the support 
for property claims or a demand for social protections – seek 
the institutions (or forums) in which their demands have 
standing and are likely to find favourable response (von Benda 
Beckman 1981). They shop for, and thus reinforce, effective 
institutions and authorities. While there is forum shopping from 
below – that is shopping by the people in need of services and 
adjudication – that shapes institutions (Lund 2002; Sikor and 
Lund 2008), we observe important forum shopping from above 
(Ribot 2006; Ribot et al. 2008). In top-down forum shopping, 
higher-level forums, such as international development agencies 
or governments, are shopping for local forums, such as local 
institutions and authorities to work with. The local institutions 
they choose have consequences for local rights, recourse and 
representation – the local institutional landscape. Thus, the word 
‘choice’ (e.g. the choice of local-level by higher-level forums) 
helps us to explore the logic of how, that is through which 
institutions, intervening agents engage with local people – based 
on interests and ideologies within a set of structural and discursive 
relations and constraints. These choices are consummated when 
intervening agencies empower or work with, that is when they 
recognize, local institutions (see Taylor 1994; Fraser 2000; 
Povinelli 2002; Ribot 2006,2007; Ribot et al. 2008). 
The recognised, and thus authorised, institutions often 
stand as representatives of certain groups (e.g. forest users, or 
indigenous peoples). Yet, they may or may not be considered 
as representatives in the eyes of these people. Although they 
are empowered and authorised by donors, they may not 
be considered legitimate, particularly when their roles and 
actions contradict or run against the needs and aspirations of 
those they claim to represent.14 Many theorists (Manor 1999; 
Agrawal and Ribot 1999; Manin et al. 1999; Ribot 2004) 
underline that democratic representation and the legitimacy 
of democratically elected authorities and institutions is 
measured by their responsiveness to the needs and aspirations 
of their constituents and their accountability towards them. 
Pitkin (1967) and Manin et al. (1999) call this ‘substantive 
representation’: where representatives ‘stand for’ and act in 
the best interests of the represented, and are responsive to, 
because they are accountable to, the latter – to the degree to 
which that is possible (on elite capture and the vicissitudes of 
local democracy) (Bardhan 1997; Manor 1999; Persha and 
Andersson 2014; Lund and Saito-Jensen 2013). 
The articles in this special issue explore the degree to 
which the institutions being chosen by intervening agents are 
substantively representative of, that is empowered to respond 
to and held accountable by, the full range of local citizens. 
Their research also explored the reasons that intervening 
agents choose to support the kinds of local authorities they 
engage with – the degree to which this engagement is about 
creating substantive democracy or the degree to which it is 
driven by other concerns – expedience, control, privileging 
the efficiency of project goals over democracy objectives or 
ideological concerns. These case studies are in many senses 
exploratory rather than decisive. Nevertheless, they illustrate 
the effects of choices being made by intervening agencies on 
the local institutional landscape and its ability of institutions 
to democratically represent the citizens of their jurisdictions.
CONTRIBUTIONS TO THIS SPECIAL ISSUE 
The contributions to the volume are described below, organised 
from higher-scale to local interventions. Walters and Ece 
examine international REDD+ project negotiations in the 
Congo Basin region; Mbeche and Nuesiri explore national 
REDD+ Preparedness Programs in Uganda and Nigeria. Ece 
examines mid-level elected sub-national government’s role in a 
forestry program in Senegal. Faye, Chomba and Baruah present 
village-level forestry cases in Senegal, Kenya and Ghana. 
Gretchen Walters and Melis Ece (this issue) explore power 
struggles within a World Bank-led REDD+ project that brings 
together Congo-Basin countries under the Central African 
Forests Commission (COMIFAC). Over four years of project 
development and changing REDD+ engagement, they show 
how the power of the World Bank to allocate resources comes 
into tension with the sovereignty of each nation, as they sit 
at the project negotiation table. What appears as an arena of 
equals for regional cooperation on REDD+ is an ambiguous 
space in which agendas are fought out. Cameroon continued 
to engage under these circumstances while Gabon withdrew 
from REDD+ as a whole and only partially engaged with the 
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project. The authors observe that “countries are expected to 
adapt their existing forestry policies to REDD+ process needs, 
often according to guidelines handed down from international 
climate change negotiations.” These impositions occurred 
despite that REDD+ social protections require conformity with 
national laws (UN-REDD no date). Under these conditions, 
those countries with the ability to withdraw and forego REDD+ 
opportunities were able to set their own agendas. In this case, 
the donors, as in all multi- and bi-lateral forestry programs, are 
mandated to work with authorities that represent their nation 
states on REDD+ – usually officials from forestry ministries. 
In the remaining articles in this issue, however, we will see that 
while these ministries are taken to represent ‘nations’ in the 
international arena, their domestic practices (in REDD+ and 
in community forestry) fall grossly short of even supporting 
democratic principles in local decision-making. While this 
article does not directly address choice and recognition of local 
institutions, it provides background for the kind of international 
context in which international forestry programs and their 
national components unfold. 
Mbeche (this issue) and Nuesiri (this issue) examine 
representation in REDD+ Preparedness Programs (R-PP) that 
support REDD+ policy design in Uganda and Nigeria (also see 
Marfo 2015). They argue that despite the participatory claims of 
the national R-PPs, national-scale ‘stakeholder’ consultations 
are limited to a biased set of non-representative actors. The R-PP 
policy consultations invited few representatives of indigenous 
forest-dependent peoples or elected local governments. NGOs 
and government officials constitute the majority of invitees. 
Mbeche and Nuesiri found that REDD+ implementers reasoned 
that local actors lacked the ability to understand the technical 
details involved in REDD+ and therefore they needed experts 
to mediate their interests (see also Faye 2015). In practice, they 
only incorporated local actors who validated decisions that had 
been made by experts. Further, they circumvented elected local 
governments whom they felt would ‘slow down’ or ‘politicise’ 
the R-PP (also see Ribot et al. 2008). These two articles show 
that there is little democratic or deliberative debate in the 
‘consultations’ leading to the preparation of REDD+ strategy 
documents.
To receive REDD+ finance, developing countries must 
prepare an R-PP document through a process with input 
from indigenous and forest-dependent peoples – a claim 
towards their substantive representation. Both UN-REDD 
and the World Bank’s FCPF require interested countries 
and project developers to follow FPIC principles in the 
development of national REDD+ legal and policy frameworks 
(FCPF and UN-REDD, 2012 ; also see Anderson 2011:15). 
FPIC is also required from affected populations before the 
implementation of REDD+ projects (World Bank 2012; 
FCPF and UN-REDD 2012). The World Bank’s social and 
environmental safeguards also apply to the R-PP, requiring 
FPIC before REDD+ financing is provided (World Bank 2012). 
In addition, the R-PP preparation guidelines call for each 
country “to give forest dependent populations, in particular, 
indigenous communities a right to negotiate the terms of 
REDD design and implementation” and requires “inclusion 
of indigenous and forest dependent communities through their 
own appointed representatives” (Mbeche this issue; also see 
FCPF and UN-REDD 2012).
Robert Mbeche (this issue) describes how stakeholder 
consultation processes for R-PP were carried out by the 
World Bank and the Norwegian Embassy in Uganda. Here, 
the World Bank recognized the National Forest Authority 
(NFA), as REDD+ focal point. The NFA created a secretariat 
composed of private international consultants, a steering 
committee of ministers, and working groups populated mostly 
by NGOs and consultants. The R-PP working groups had no 
representation from local groups. Sixty-one percent of its 
members were from NGOs, 23% from central government 
ministries, 9% from private companies, and 6% from research 
institutes. Despite there being 2,372 elected rural councillors 
and five levels of democratically elected local government 
in Uganda, the Uganda R-PP was centralised and had no 
direct input from the elected local authorities. In addition, 
a parallel ‘highly participatory’ World Bank consultation 
process with 154 participants included only seven elected 
rural councillors in Uganda. Mbeche (this issue) also points 
out that in consultations carried out by the World Bank the 
government officials were preferred as ‘representatives’. In 
subsequent consultations by the Norwegian Embassy, more 
importance was given to forms of representation based on 
ethnic and autochthonous identity claims. 
All of these processes in Uganda managed to avoid 
a complex and time-consuming democratic process, to 
perform a consultation in order to meet the requirements 
of REDD+, UN and World Bank participation and FPIC 
requirements, and to facilitate the quick implementation of the 
program by ‘educating’ local people in the technical details 
of REDD+ implementation. In short, Mbeche (this issue) 
found that the REDD+ consultations serve the instrumental 
outcomes of REDD+ by: i) ‘educating’ the participants in 
REDD+, particularly on its ‘technical’ aspects; ii) legitimising 
the REDD+ strategy in the eyes of the donors by performing 
‘representation’ of local people; and iii) promoting the quick 
achievement of the REDD+ objectives. 
Emmanuel Nuesiri (this issue), working in Cross River 
State, Nigeria, found that elected local governments were 
replaced in the National REDD+ consultative process by NGOs 
and chiefs who were called on to speak on behalf of their 
members and their subordinate populations. Citizens of local 
jurisdictions were not represented through a democratically 
accountable process. The REDD+ preparation process 
developed a discourse of representation and even of democracy, 
yet they did not include substantive representation as part 
of the REDD+ FPIC process. In the Nigeria consultation 
process, the REDD implementing agents had their own 
idea of democracy – rather than leaders being accountable 
to the people, it is a cacophony of voices handpicked by 
the Nigeria-REDD secretariat to legitimate the UN-REDD 
process. This arrangement allows the UN-REDD secretariat 
and organisation (international and national) to choose the 
[Downloaded free from http://www.conservationandsociety.org on Tuesday, March 27, 2018, IP: 139.184.180.128]
Disempowering Democracy / 363
actions they see fit while claiming that they have the consent 
and backing of local people. The farce of representation and 
pretence of democracy is a necessary step they must go through 
– what Nuesiri calls ‘symbolic’ representation (see Pitkin 1967; 
Törnquist et al. 2009) – in implementing their programs. These 
are programs that will be implemented whether or not local 
people need, want or benefit from them. 
As in Uganda, UN-REDD in Nigeria produces a highly 
skewed notion of representation. At the national scale, 
the NGOs are included in REDD+ policy consultations as 
‘stakeholders’ and as the representatives of ‘local people.’ 
Representation in the drafting of Nigeria’s REDD-readiness 
document (supported by the UN-REDD) is also skewed. 
The majority of the ‘representatives’ are from the Forestry 
Commission, followed by the NGOs, the chiefs and ‘community 
forestry groups’. The elected local authorities are not included 
in the consultations. None of the chosen ‘representatives’ are 
accountable and responsive to forest-dependent or indigenous 
peoples. The choice of NGOs and chiefs reflects the donors’ 
understanding of participation in FPIC while producing mere 
‘symbolic’ forms of representation – it is simply not intended 
to be substantive. Nuesiri found that the donor’s ‘stakeholder’ 
approach that included ‘all affected’ brought in a variety 
of interested parties, facilitating elite capture rather than 
citizen-driven decision-making. 
Both Nuesiri and Mbeche found that “efficiency in achieving 
the program goals” was an important criterion reflecting the 
instrumental rationality in donors’ institutional choices at 
national R-PP consultations. Mbeche notes “efficiency” was 
constructed not only in relation to forestry and carbon-related 
technical expertise, but also in relation to the program’s 
budgetary and time constraints. Nuesiri, however, adds that the 
ability to wield political power and control over resources and 
people to achieve the program goals can be equally important 
in shaping donors’ rationality of choice, reinforcing the 
accumulation of power in the hands of government officials, 
NGOs and local elites, who are neither elected nor downwardly 
accountable.
Melis Ece (this issue) shows how democratic spaces are 
closed down through the conversion of elected regional councils 
into instruments for privatisation of commercial and use rights 
to public forests in Senegal. The choice to work with regional 
councils in forestry projects is partly conditioned by neoliberal 
decentralisation reforms. When the 1996 reforms re-instituted 
the regional councils as ‘local authorities’, they also gave them 
the role of intermediaries of development. Ece argues that this 
role helped transform the regional council into a locus for 
business like contractual agreements involving elected local 
governments and donor-funded “community-based” forestry 
projects. This shift helped to displace the decision-making on 
public forests from rural councils to regional councils. However, 
this arrangement did not prevent the Forest Department’s 
overriding of both rural and regional councils’ decisions. It 
also enabled donor-funded forestry projects to push further 
forest-based commodity production and privatisation of access 
over public forests via the regional council.
Ece also discusses the consequences of undemocratic 
practices and institutional choices of ‘community-based’ 
forestry and conservation projects at the rural community-scale. 
In the region of Tambacounda, the community forests are 
created for the commercial production of forest products, such 
as charcoal for urban use. Ece notes that the donor-funded 
forestry projects, which initiate the creation of reserves, 
bypass base-level rural councils in key decisions about land 
allocation and in the drafting of management plans. Further, 
despite their competing territorial claims, different projects 
share a similar neoliberal market rationality, oriented towards 
increasing commodification and privatization of rights over 
public forests. Ece argues that this market-oriented rationality 
is also important in shaping the projects’ local institutional 
choices. They put in place and recognise forest management 
committees as local institutional partners. The project-based 
local committees are treated as commercial organisations, with 
exclusive private access to trade of forest commodities and 
responsibility for forest management. 
The article shows that through these arrangements, the 
legitimacy of the elected local governments (rural councils) 
is undermined in two ways. First, the rural councils have the 
legal rights to manage forests and commercial forest activity, 
yet they are not included in forestry decisions by the Forestry 
Department and international donors, who prefer to work 
through ‘committees.’ Second, the elected rural councils 
have been subordinated to intermediate-level elected regional 
councils, positioned as a hub for donor-funded community 
forestry projects. The decision-making forum of the regional 
council is hijacked to subordinate the rural councils, to promote 
commodification and privatisation of rights over public forests 
and turned into an arena for performance of participatory 
democracy. 
Also in Senegal, Papa Faye (this issue) details how forestry 
decisions, legally under the jurisdiction of elected rural 
councils, are taken from these representative bodies and 
given to non-representative forest management committees 
created by a World Bank sustainable development project 
in Tambacounda. He describes how foresters and projects 
corralled village-based charcoal producers into the invented 
category of ‘local producers’, and then delimited their 
rights as distinct from and less than those of urban-based 
merchants. After setting these committees up in the name of 
participation and representation, Faye shows how forestry 
laws, practices and discourses systematically limited their 
rights by loading them with the burdens of forest management 
and depriving committee members of direct access to forestry 
markets – they had to sell most of their charcoal to urban-based 
forestry merchants. In parallel to the committees, foresters 
allowed urban merchants to buy from committees and to 
also hire migrant labourers to cut wood and make charcoal. 
Merchants, unlike local producers, were not saddled with the 
odium of management. This forestry system hemmed forest 
villagers into subsistence labour while allocating lucrative 
trade opportunities to the urban elite. Forest villagers wind 
up poor, living at subsistence on the brink of disaster. This 
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‘sustainable development’ project has recently claimed it will 
support climate adaptation by alleviating rural poverty through 
revenue generation from the charcoal business, but instead was 
enriching forest merchants and impoverishing forest villagers 
while teaching them to cut and carbonize their forests for low 
wages: this does not seem to be an effective way of reducing 
climate-related (or any other) risks. It is also not strengthening 
the long-term democratic representation of forest villages 
in forestry or in any other decisions as it is sidelining and 
delegitimising the elected rural councils.
Faye’s contribution illustrates also how the project’s 
institutional choices and the supporting technical justifications 
are subject to contestation by elected local governments. 
During the first phase of the World Bank project, the forest 
service rationalised their choice of committees with specious 
technical claims arguing that the committees had the capacity 
to implement technically required management. Their actions 
showed they valued implementation over the procedural 
concerns of democracy (Ribot 2008). The forest service and 
projects used a logic of technical necessity to override local 
concerns and to circumvent the elected local governments 
(community councils). Faye also shows, during the course of 
these management impositions, that: 
 The stakes involved in the control of access rights and 
the institutions that enforce them had become very clear 
to ELGs [Elected Local Governments]. Indeed, PCRs 
[presidents of the elected rural council] understood that in 
order to respond effectively to local needs and to secure 
political visibility for themselves, they needed access to 
resources and the ability to exercise authority. Therefore, 
they began resisting the technical claims as much as they 
could, mobilising political arguments that are deeply 
rooted in decentralisation laws, and working to control 
the revenues flowing from forest-related activities. 
After the first phase of the project, the elected councils 
challenged the domination by taking decision-making back from 
forest service and the project created committees – a demand 
from elected local governments for observance of national 
law. Here elected councils chose themselves. In the project’s 
next phase, however, the project returned to re-establish its 
non-democratic committee-based implementation units. They 
then made these units into ‘associations’, which are private 
organisations that elected local governments will not be able to 
dissolve at the end of the next project phase. The elected local 
governments believe that the government’s logic for creating 
associations was to override elected local governments (Faye 
2015a, 2015b).
In her article, Manali Baruah (this issue) focuses on a 
Community Resource Management Area (CREMA) that 
encourages farmers to plant timber trees on cocoa farms 
in South-Western Ghana. The CREMA approach has 
been promoted as a collaborative form of natural resource 
management that would help generate conservation and 
financial benefits for communities living around the protected 
areas. However, CREMAs like the one analysed by Baruah, 
are also implemented in off-reserve degraded forested areas 
to increase timber production and introduce tree tenure 
privatisation. In Ghana, the elected District Assemblies’ powers 
had been further limited after the reversal of decentralisations 
in 1996. Together with the chiefs, who grant access rights to 
land, forests and trees in their traditional ‘wassa’ areas, the 
state forestry administration retains the key decision-making 
powers over the commercial exploitation of off-reserve forests 
and trees. In this context, the ownership of the trees, access to 
tools, seedlings and benefits (including carbon benefits) need 
to be negotiated, a task undertaken by a local NGO positioned 
as the CREMA project implementer. 
Baruah shows that despite claiming to strengthen democratic 
resource management through CREMAs, donors reinforced 
the existing centralised power relations by circumventing the 
elected district assemblies, recognising traditional elites and 
chiefs as de facto representatives in CREMA management and, 
choosing private entrepreneurs as the project implementing 
“local NGOs”. Similar to other cases presented in this 
volume, the project established natural resource management 
committees to manage the CREMA. Here, however, chiefs 
occupied a prominent role both at regional and village-scales. 
Members of the committees were selected and nominated by 
the chiefs, often in the presence of the district forestry officers. 
In the process of establishment of the CREMA by the 
Forestry Commission and in the drafting of its bylaws by 
international donors, the District Assemblies were not even 
‘consulted’. In this sense, foresters further weakened and 
delegitimised elected local authorities by diminishing their 
role in public decision-making. While the choice to work 
with chiefs and NGOs is justified on grounds that these bodies 
somehow represent the ‘public’, the fact that they are not 
elected or accountable to the people makes them effectively 
private bodies. Simultaneously, to the degree that they are 
accountable to donors and the forest service who empower 
them to implement forestry activities, they are effectively 
administrative branches of these two extra-local agencies. So, 
through both this effective privatisation (the degree to which 
these non-state bodies have new discretion) of public resources 
and through external administrative control, the space of local 
public decision-making discretion is reduced; substantively 
weakening local democratic representation. 
Of course, if in Ghana participation means allowing private 
groups such as local elite-led NGOs and ‘community-based 
initiatives’ to engage in and implement resource use decisions 
on behalf of the local people, then this non-public form of 
inclusion opposes democracy. Indeed, more democracy here 
would mean less privatisation since democracy needs public 
resources and public decisions (a sphere of public decision 
making) in order to play a democratic role. Forests in Ghana 
could, if managed by local representative authorities, provide 
a collective local public domain. The contradictory talk 
of participation, representation and accountability while 
promoting private decision-making and benefit, needs to be 
evaluated. Perhaps private forestry decisions and use can 
increase efficiency or even make forests more lucrative, but 
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at what cost to fledgling rural democracies? Democracy is not 
being chosen by these intervening agencies – even if it is one 
of their stated values. The CREMAs are the proposed basis 
of REDD+ Readiness in Ghana, yet they are not supporting 
community representation. If participation means implanting 
the administrative orders of external agencies it is also not 
democracy. In this sense we have two enclosures of the 
discretion of public democratic authorities; even the limited 
powers devolved to elected authorities are taken away and 
given to private bodies and others are retained by central 
agencies as required activities of the intervening agencies. 
Membership in CREMAs is exclusive despite that CREMA 
and donor guidelines insist on elections and inclusiveness. 
The implementing agents excluded anyone whose interests 
or activities were not aligned with the objectives of the 
CREMA. They were also excluded from benefits derived 
from its activities and from receiving material from the NGO. 
Although implementing NGOs, like IUCN along with the 
Ghanaian forestry and wildlife line offices were aware that 
the process by which the committee members are selected was 
undemocratic, they chose not to interfere. “Their position is 
justified by the necessity to adhere to project ‘timelines and 
objectives’.” The rationale given by implementing agencies 
for choosing to work through local NGOs and Chiefs included 
the merits of community-based initiatives, civil society 
engagement, donor mandated ‘participatory’ processes, regard 
for customary systems and perceived lack of capacity of the 
local governments. However, the private interests behind these 
institutional choices were often economic and political. The 
donors and foresters rationalise their lack of engagement with 
representation and accountability via institutional mandates, 
technical and managerial goals. 
Susan Chomba (this volume) observes a key dilemma 
of representation faced by a prominent private-sector 
REDD+ project in Kenya. Do forestry programs work with 
unaccountable and ineffective local governments or should 
they circumvent them by creating their own more-effective 
committees? Kenya is transitioning from a centrally managed 
form of local administration towards empowered elected 
local governments. Prior to the 2013 general election, local 
administration was made of weak elected local councils 
without financial powers running in parallel to strong local 
chiefs appointed by the provincial administration. The 
2010 constitution, however, mandated the transformation 
of the councils into democratically elected ‘decentralised’ 
county governments with political and fiscal powers and 
responsibilities. The 2010 Kenyan constitution also provided 
for the centralised system to be phased out. Given the 
representative roles that elected leaders are designed to fulfill 
under the constitution, they would have likely been the first 
choice had the project been aiming to support and work through 
democratically elected local governments. But, the local elected 
leaders, elected before 2013, were circumvented. Project staff 
argued that this was to avoid political interference or because 
they viewed them as corrupt. After the new constitution, the 
project would not work with the newly elected local leaders 
because the necessary resources and infrastructure were not 
yet in place. On the other hand, the centrally appointed local 
officials made of chiefs were directly engaged in the project 
in the beginning, but later only as ex-officio members because 
they were similarly perceived as unaccountable, corrupt and 
inefficient. So, the REDD+ implementing agents largely 
skirted newly elected institutions. Instead they created their 
own single-purpose ‘elected’ Location Carbon Committees 
(LCCs), that worked with Community Based Organizations 
(CBOs) to implement REDD+ at the local level.
The project, being part of REDD+, had a fraught choice 
in meeting the universal principles of participation, 
representation and democracy under the United Nations 
conventions and declarations, as well as those mandated 
for REDD+. Their choice to circumvent the ‘representative’ 
local government institutions appeared to contradict the 
REDD+ safeguard principle of ensuring full and effective 
participation of all relevant stakeholders. Indeed, while 
the project could claim that their carbon committees 
appeared representative on account of their being elected, 
the committee elections were hardly democratic. In a 
community meeting, voters had to bow their heads so they 
could (wink wink) not see others and raise their hands to be 
counted by the administrative chief. In this case, voters had 
to trust the chiefs to count correctly and feared that others 
would tilt their heads to see who they voted for. Of course, 
voters might also not feel free to express their positions in 
front of powerful chiefs. In short, this system was nothing 
like a secret ballot that would constitute a fair election. In 
this sense, the REDD+ decisions and processes reflected 
performed participation and representation while elected 
local government was left on the sideline. 
The studies in this special issue provide democracy 
lessons for REDD+, carbon forestry, and any participatory 
forms of natural resource management. Each case illustrates 
conundrums that projects face when required to represent, 
negotiate, and protect local interests. In community-based 
forestry in Senegal, as well as in REDD+ carbon forestry in 
Nigeria, Kenya, and Ghana, the intervening agents require 
representation of local people in decision-making in order to 
protect local people’s interests. The Ghanaian and Kenyan 
cases show how representation safeguards are compromised 
by an inappropriate circumvention of local government in 
favour of chiefs, NGOs, CBOs and local committees. Yet, 
despite their failures, these modes of participation are held 
up as the model for how representation will be conducted 
when REDD+ is implemented nationally. The cases all show 
that representation is given second tier to implementing 
of other forestry project goals. Representation is required, 
but merely performed as a theatrical ‘symbolic’ enactment 
(Nuesiri this issue). Substantive representation, even when 
there are democratically elected local authorities, is nowhere 
to be seen. While we would have liked more analysis of the 
rationality of institutional choice – the politics of choice 
and recognition -- these papers just begin that part of the 
analysis. 
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CONCLUSION
Elected local governments would seem to be good institutions 
to represent local people in local decisions. But they are 
not given the opportunity to do so. They are ignored and 
avoided. This is not because they are weak or even culturally 
inappropriate. It is because international development 
agencies – certainly those working on natural resource 
management – choose not to work with or through them. Local 
democratic institutions exist in most places. Yet, environmental 
projects and programs choose to work with institutions 
that operate in parallel to elected local governments. This 
choice, unfortunately, perpetuates the view that existing local 
democratic institutions are incapable of responding to local 
needs – it makes them appear irrelevant or incapable, without 
giving them a chance to prove otherwise. Local governments 
sit powerless on the sideline. Interventions create and work 
with alternative institutions at a moment when governments 
across the developing world have legislated into existence 
new elected local democratic institutions (Crook & Manor 
1998; World Bank 2000; Ndegwa 2002). Indeed, these choices 
support local institutions that masquerade as representative 
but remain accountable to donors, private organisations, line 
ministries or to an identity- or interest-based sub-section of 
the population. They foster committees, NGOs, chiefs, and 
other private bodies while generating a specious image of 
representation. The studies in this special issue documented 
how projects and government agencies chose to create and 
work through parallel institutions in forestry in Ghana, Kenya, 
Nigeria, Senegal and Uganda. 
The 16th United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) Conference of the Parties (COP16) in 
Cancun in 2010 established safeguards for implementing 
the largest global forestry project, REDD+. The Cancun 
Agreements called for actions that “complement or are 
consistent with the objectives of national forest programs 
and relevant international conventions and agreements” 
(UN-REDD no date), but, they did not address the fact that 
most national forestry programs fail to adequately uphold local 
representation or human rights. They called for “transparent 
and effective national forest governance structures, taking 
into account national legislation and sovereignty” (UN-REDD 
no date), but failed to recognize that transparency is only 
effective where there is sanction15 (Fox 2007) and that national 
legislation often fails to provide for local representation or 
rights. They called for “respect for the knowledge and rights 
of indigenous peoples and members of local communities…” 
(UN-REDD no date), yet failed to acknowledge that many 
people who have lived in forests for generations are not 
indigenous and require equal representation and protection; 
safeguards should not be creating second-class citizens. 
They demanded “full and effective participation of relevant 
stakeholders, including, in particular, indigenous peoples and 
local communities” (UN-REDD no date), without defining 
stakeholders as citizens rather than merely interested parties. 
Indeed, why should a non-resident merchant hold a ‘stake’ 
in someone else’s forest just because they stand to profit 
from it? They may have an interest, but the claim of rights 
or a ‘stake’ in the public resource belongs, by definition, to 
citizens. Stakeholders are indeed citizens if and when they 
live in the jurisdiction that presides over the public resource in 
question. So, let them vote if they want a ‘stake’ in the public 
resource; they should not be having a binding decision-making 
power at the negotiating table. They can and should inform 
(or misinform) decision-making processes, but they do not 
deserve a disproportional say in decisions. The decision 
should be by accountable representatives. Decisions over 
public forests and other natural resources should be made in 
a democratic manner, rather than in proportion to the interests 
of ‘stakeholders’ recognised by actors within line ministries 
or projects.
The articles in this special issue show that while all 
forest carbon and conservation programs studied, aimed or 
claimed to represent local people’s needs and aspirations 
in their decisions, generated very little representation that 
might be called democratic. Why is this so? Why do project 
and program managers choose to circumvent elected local 
government? Given that the safeguards outlined in the Cancun 
Agreements do not call for representation, it is not a shock that 
representation does not result from their application. They call 
for conformity with the status quo and the favouring of the 
influential, defining them as ‘stakeholders’ and giving them 
stakes in decision proportional to their interests. Several other 
motives for choosing to avoid elected local governments also 
emerge from the studies. First, elected local governments 
are avoided due to ideological favouring of markets and 
privatisation (Ece this issue). These lead to enclosures that 
remove public decisions from democratic institutions and 
shift them to the private domain (ranging from individuals and 
corporations to NGOs). Second, elected local governments are 
avoided due to collusion between forestry service or project 
authorities and wealthy actors involved in lucrative activities 
where democracy or elected local authorities might undermine 
wealthy elites (Ece this issue; Faye this issue). As we well know, 
democratic representation can result in redistribution – and the 
rich and powerful do not seem to want to give up their wealth 
and power. Third, elected local governments are avoided 
because many intervening environment and development 
agents believe that civil society and stakeholder approaches or 
customary authorities constitute democracy (Baruah this issue; 
Faye this issue; Mbeche this issue; Nuesiri this issue). While 
some of these processes or actors may represent people, they 
lack systematic accountability to the people as a whole (who we 
consider to be the residents of the jurisdiction where the public 
resource resides) and therefore they are not democratic (Manin 
et al. 1999). Fourth, local government is avoided because 
democracy is a slow and laborious process that requires time 
and resources, making it an unlikely choice by the agents 
under pressure to implement forestry management or carbon 
programs. Fifth, given that many local people might object 
to the very programs being implemented, their inclusion 
and consultation may be inconvenient and threatening to the 
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project personnel trying to make interventions – they being 
under great pressure to demonstrate success (Baviskar 2004). 
A sixth reason is that many technical agencies and project 
experts feel that the decisions are technical and belong in 
their expert hands. So, technical necessity is often used as 
an excuse for centralising decisions with line ministries and 
project staff (Faye this issue, Mbeche this issue, 2015; Mitchell 
2002; Easterly 2013). 
Many intervening agents also believe that local 
governments are corrupt or inefficient, so they circumvent 
them (Chomba this issue). This may be true, but if the 
same intervening agents tried to circumvent a corrupt 
local government in the United States or Europe, even to 
implement a park management project or build a playground, 
these agents would find themselves quickly incarcerated. It 
is not acceptable to circumvent government agencies just 
because (or even if) they are corrupt. Many are corrupt 
(Bardhan 1997). So are many corporations, NGOs and 
chieftaincies (Ntsebeza 2005; Temudo 2015). Rather than 
circumventing corrupt local governments, it is incumbent 
on anyone wishing to intervene to work to make those 
governments more accountable and effective. Along these 
lines, Chomba (this issue), working in Kenya where agencies 
judged local government to be corrupt, recommends that in the 
short run, REDD+ projects can work with local committees 
and community-based organizations, but should place them 
under the authority of elected governments (see Ribot 2004). 
Integrating these institutions and decision making into 
elected local government – but establishing project-imposed 
checks and balances in the form of committee deliberations, 
public meetings, audits and other public accountability 
mechanisms – would get communities involved and help 
them to learn critical lessons on how to articulate their needs 
to elected leaders and how to hold their leaders accountable. 
In the process, it would make these leaders relevant and worth 
holding to account. 
Instituting democratic governance in the long run will 
require the implementers of REDD+ – and any other laws, 
programs or projects – to entrust democratically elected local 
government with resources and discretionary powers. People 
will then learn to trust them when local governments have been 
made accountable through the normal politics and multiple 
accountability relations that ensure democratic practice. The 
Responsive Forest Governance Initiative16 that generated 
the research presented in this special issue also produced a 
set of guidelines for supporting local democratic processes 
while implementing natural resource interventions (Ribot 
2016,2017; Barrow et al. 2015). Despite the fact that there are 
many structural and political-economic obstacles to supporting 
elected local government, those guidelines can be boiled down 
to two words: choose democracy. 
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NOTES
1. The meaning of consent in FPIC has been debated since FPIC’s 
origins in the drafting of the United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Uncertainties remain regarding 
the relationship between consultation and consent. In practice, 
the interpretation of ‘consent’ is decidedly narrow. In 2000 the 
World Bank commissioned an independent report on Extractive 
Industries to determine whether resource extraction aligns 
with the Bank’s mission of poverty alleviation and sustainable 
resource use. The evaluation report (IFC 2003) argued for FPIC 
to empower communities with self-determination. However, 
the World Bank was concerned that ‘consent’ in FPIC would 
promote veto by individuals and groups, and opted instead 
for ‘consultation’ geared towards gaining the broad support 
of affected communities. FPIC differs from mere consultation 
in several important ways, but most significantly in the way 
decision-making authority is exercised and legitimated. 
Consultation requires only an exchange of information between 
project implementers and communities, but does not involve 
any transfers of powers. It does not require that information 
be exchanged or that final project decisions be based on the 
views and needs of the affected communities. Thus ‘C’ has 
effectively been re-interpreted to mean a duty to consult without 
the obligation to obtain consent. We contend that the objective 
of consultation must be to obtain FPIC Consent.
2. Representation is the responsiveness of leaders to the 
people. Representation becomes democratic when that 
responsiveness is driven by accountability of those leaders to 
the people (Manin et al. 1999). Achieving responsiveness with 
accountability requires leaders who have powers to respond 
– that is executive, legislative and judicial powers backed by 
resources such as knowledge, finance and bulldozers. It also 
requires citizens who have means to reward or punish, that 
is to sanction or hold accountable, their empowered leaders. 
Sanctions can include elections or many other means – such as 
embeddedness of leaders in community, third-party monitoring, 
courts, information diffusion, threats of violence, shaming, etc. 
(see Ribot 2004:annex A; Agrawal and Ribot 2012). Elections 
are important despite being systematically inadequate on 
their own (see Chomba this issue). So, accountability can 
also be achieved without elections,although we see elections 
and the standard procedures of democratic government as an 
important way of legislating and institutionalizing – making 
sustainable and geographically complete – democratic practices. 
Non-election-based systems can certainly be democratic – as 
long as there are means of accountability. But representation is 
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not always democratic even when it is effective, appreciated and 
viewed as legitimate. There are many systems in which people 
are well represented without accountability of leaders. These 
are systems in which the leaders are ideologically committed 
to being responsive to local needs and aspirations. We call this 
benign dictatorship. But, benign dictatorships of this nature 
are still not democracy and are always at risk of deviating from 
popular desire. Electoral systems are also at great risk of being 
undemocratic, when they are poorly structured, lack powers 
to respond and lack multiple accountability relations beyond 
elections.
3. Here, we focus mainly on the institutional aspects of 
organizations.
4. RFGI is a collaborative research and policy initiative of the 
Council for the Development of Social Science Research 
in Africa (CODESRIA), the International Union for the 
Conservation of Nature (IUCN), and the Social Dimensions 
of Environmental Policy (SDEP) program of the University 
of Illinois. See: https://sdep.earth.illinois.edu/programs/
democracyenvironment.aspx; and for publications see: https://
sdep.earth.illinois.edu/programs/rfgi_working_papers.aspx. 
5. This delegitimisation can, of course, weaken the entire 
democratic institution, or just its functioning in the domain of 
forestry.
6. Thomassen (2011) analyzes the relationship between 
representation and recognition from the perspective of identity 
politics. 
7. Although the World Bank was the leading institution that 
spearheaded the good governance approach, multi-lateral and 
bi-lateral donors adopted quickly a similar approach in their 
interventions. Policies and measures promoted under good 
governance differed from one donor to another. For example, 
Oluwu et al. 2009 argued that the WB’s approach was less 
focused on ‘democracy’ and more on economic liberalization. 
8. This is not to say that there was no revival and proliferation of 
different grass-roots organizations and associations during this 
period of liberalization. Similarly, international development 
interventions also elicited the demands for participation in 
decision-making from below. However, here we would like 
to draw attention to the emergence of a new framing of ‘civil 
society’ in development discourse, and to attending problematic 
assumptions regarding representation.
9. Intervening agents have long viewed NGOs as an alternative to 
centralised state administrations in implementing development 
and conservation interventions. This trend emerged during 
the implementation of structural adjustment policies, and is 
associated with a broader shift in development policy thinking 
and practice in Africa and beyond (Harrison 2005; Kamat 2004).
10. For an excellent critical overview of REDD+ see Lund, 
Sungusia, Mabele and Scheba 2017.
11. Ribot 1999 argued that the appeal to all of these non-democratic 
local authorities, chiefs (whether or not part of the current state 
administration), NGOs, and even local administrative units of 
government is a modern reproduction of indirect rule. In all 
cases it is the management of rural subjects.
12. As in legal theory, we stop process tracing analysis of cause at 
the first recursive node of human will to identify what we would 
call an agent (Holmes 2009). Further, in our framing objects do 
not have agency, thus we trace causality to human will; objects 
do not think and therefore cannot be responsible, humans do 
think (Arendt 2003). In this way we avoid an infinitely looping 
analysis of the relation between agency and structure. 
13. Rutt and Lund 2014 describe how projects choose civil society 
organizations based on their prior partners. They chose partners 
they know they can work with.
14. One complication to this scenario is that donor-recognised 
representatives can use the powers and means transferred to 
them to strengthen their client networks, or to use these means 
in a way to meet their constituents’ needs and aspirations, in 
order to become locally legitimate. 
15. Transparency does not cure the widespread ‘transparent 
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